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NOTES
action must be qualified by equitable considerations to prevent undue
hardship upon a buyer.7 1 Additionally, nothing in the statute should
modify such rights as the buyer may otherwise be entitled to under tort,
contract, or equitable law. The legislature should place appropriate en-
forcement powers in the local governing unit and encourage their utili-
zation. And, accordingly, as the governing unit takes the initiative in
assuring realization of subdivision control objectives, the courts must
seek to provide a minimum of injury and a maximum of redress for the
lot purchaser.
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES: A STUDY IN
DESULTORY REGULATION
Forty years ago, the Clayton Act became a part of the antitrust
laws of this country.' However, it was not until 1953 that the Supreme
Court of the United States was afforded an opportunity to construe
Section 8 of the Act which prohibits a common director between com-
peting corporations. 2 John A. Hancock, a partner in the Lehman Broth-
ers Investment Company, served as a director on the boards of six cor-
porations (W. T. Grant and S. H. Kress Companies; Sears, Roebuck
and Company and Bond Stores, Incorporated; Kroger and Jewel Tea
Companies). After unsuccessful attempts to persuade Hancock to resign
from the boards of one of each of the three sets of competitors, the
Department of Justice filed complaints alleging that he held these posi-
tions in violation of Section 8. Soon after, Hancock resigned from the
Kress, Kroger, and Bond Companies, apparently terminating all objec-
tionable interlocking directorates.3 But this conclusion fails to contem-
71. This, where for one reason or another the rescinding of the buyer's purchase
would produce an unfair burden upon him (as where he has built upon his lot), would
be an excellent place for the plan commission to consider the over-all circumstances and,
by weighing the respective benefits and burdens, seek to work out some fair and equitable
solution before resort to the courts.
1. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1946).
2. "No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corpora-
tions, and one of which has capital, surplus, and the undivided profits aggregating more
than $1,000,000 engaged in whole or in part in commerce, other than banks . . . and
common carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce . . . if such corporations
are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their business and location or operation,
competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would
constitute a violation of any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws." 38 STAT.
732 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1946).
3. The term interlocking directorate when used in a general sense embraces any
interconnection between corporate entities. As used in this Note, interlocking directorate
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